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Abstract: most business decisions are made with analysis, but some are judgment calls not 
susceptible to analysis due to time or information constraints. In this article, we present a real-
life case study of critical business decision making of PerceptIn, an autonomous driving 
technology startup: in early years of PerceptIn, PerceptIn had to make a decision on the design of 
computing systems for its autonomous vehicle products. By providing details on PerceptIn’s 
decision process and the results of the decision, we hope to provide some insights that can be 
beneficial to entrepreneurs and engineering managers in technology startups. 
 
Background: PerceptIn was established in 2016 to develop visual perception technologies for 
autonomous vehicles and robots.  Since its inception, PerceptIn has successfully attracted over 
10 million USD of venture capital funding, from Walden International, Matrix Partners, and 
Samsung Ventures [1].  PerceptIn is an international technology startup with operations in the 
U.S., Japan, Europe, and Asia. PerceptIn consists of over 30 researchers and engineers and 10 
business professionals.  The business professionals are responsible for business development in 
different markets and gather feedbacks for the company’s R&D efforts, whereas the engineers 
and researchers are responsible for developing cutting edge autonomous driving technologies. 
In the past three years, PerceptIn has generated over 20 U.S. patents and over 100 international 
patents, as well as numerous research papers. 
    In 2017, PerceptIn decided to develop low speed autonomous vehicles to serve the 
micromobility market, as micromobility is a rising transport mode wherein lightweight vehicles 
cover short trips that massive transit ignore [2]. According to US Department of Transportation, 
60% of vehicle traffic is attributed to trips under 5 miles [3]. Transportation needs in short trips 
are disproportionally under-served by current mass transit systems due to high cost, which 
affects the society profoundly. Micromobility bridges transit services and communities’ needs, 
driving the rise of Mobility-as-a-Service. 
 
Business Analysis: PerceptIn’s primary customers are autonomous vehicle operators around the 
globe, and PerceptIn partners with these autonomous vehicle operators to provide micromobility 
services in different markets, such as Japan, U.S., and Europe.  PerceptIn’s ultimate goal is to 
provide affordable and reliable autonomous driving technologies that can allow PerceptIn’s 
operators to generate profits, and subsequently grow the business. In 2017 and 2018, PerceptIn 
conducted over 10 pilot projects globally to understand the micromobility market, the customer 
needs, as well as the cost structure of this business. 
One of PerceptIn’s pilot projects took place in 2017 at ZTE’s industrial park in Shenzhen China. 
ZTE is a leading Chinese telecom company with an enormous campus in Shenzhen, and the 
campus is filled with over 30,000 workers with tremendous intra-campus transportation needs. 
In this pilot project, PerceptIn’s pods transferred ZTE’s workers across the campus.  Each 
PerceptIn’s pod packs four high-definition cameras, four mid-range radar sets, and 10 ultrasound 
sensors, as well as GPS and sensors for wheel odometry [4].  From these pilot projects, PerceptIn 
collected sufficient operation data and customer feedbacks for internal business analysis.  
Based on internal business analysis, if PerceptIn can provide low-speed autonomous vehicles 
under $70,000 per unit, PerceptIn could generate a reasonable return-on-investment (ROI) for 
PerceptIn’s customers, the autonomous vehicle operators. Thus, in 2018 PerceptIn set the goal 
to develop autonomous vehicles that can be sold at a price tag $70,000, which is five to ten times 
lower than what is commonly believed to be possible for commercial autonomous vehicles. 
However, the $70,000 price tag also imposes very strict and challenging constraints on the design 
of low-speed autonomous vehicles. In detail, we have to break down the $70,000 into Non-
recurring engineering (NRE) cost such as research and development, recurring costs such as the 
cost of the chassis, the cost of drive-by-wire conversion (meaning to convert a traditional vehicle 
into one that can be controlled by computers), the cost of sensors, the cost of integration, the 
cost of customer service, and finally the cost of the computing system [5]. 
 
Situation: in June 2017, based on the initial feedbacks from the ZTE case study, PerceptIn 
conducted a study on autonomous driving computing systems [6], PerceptIn concluded that 
computing is the bottleneck for the commercial deployment of autonomous vehicles, and 
PerceptIn needed a computing system that is reliable, affordable, high-performance, and energy 
efficient. Most importantly, we needed a solution that is cost effective and has a short time-to-
market.  PerceptIn faced several options: 
1. Optimization of commercial off-the-shelf mobile System-on-Chip (SoC) computing 
systems: This approach brings several benefits, first, since mobile SoCs have reached 
economies of scale, it would have been most beneficial for PerceptIn to build its 
technology stack on affordable, backward-compatible computing systems. Second, 
PerceptIn’s vehicles target micromobility with limited speed, similar to mobile robots, for 
which mobile SoCs have been demonstrated before.  However, an extensive study is 
required to fully understand mobile SoCs’ suitability for autonomous driving, this may 
delay PerceptIn’s product launch by six months.    
2. Procurement of specialized autonomous driving computing systems: there were 
commercial computing platforms specialized for autonomous driving, such as those from 
NXP, MobilEye, and Nvidia. They are mostly Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) 
based chips that provide high performance at a much higher cost. For instance, the first-
generation of Nvidia PX2 system costs over $10,000. Besides the cost issue, these 
computing systems mostly accelerate only the perception function in autonomous driving, 
whereas PerceptIn require a system that optimizes the end-to-end performance. 
3. Development of proprietary autonomous driving computing systems: developing a 
proprietary computing system guarantees that PerceptIn have the most suitable system 
for PerceptIn’s customers and for its workloads, but also means that PerceptIn need to 
invest a significant amount of financial and personnel resources on this project. Also, the 
investment does not guarantee the success of this project. It is a huge and risky bet for a 
startup like PerceptIn.  
 
Table 1: comparisons of the three available options 
 Affordability Backward Compatibility Suitability Risk 
Option 1: mobile SoCs HIGH HIGH UNKNOWN LOW 
Option 2: specialized computing systems LOW LOW MEDIUM LOW 
Option 3: proprietary computing systems LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH 
 
Decision: then the decision process started, without quantitative evaluation methods, we had to 
use judgement calls to evaluate different options [10, 11]. We summarized these options in Table 
1, the parameters of evaluation include Affordability, Backward Compatibility, Suitability for 
autonomous driving computing, and project Risk. For all parameters, the higher the better.  For 
Affordability, option 1 is the clear winner.  For Backward Compatibility,  both option 1 and option 
3 deliver good results.  For Suitability, option 3 is the clear winner, and option 1 is unknown and 
requires additional study.  For Risk, both option 1 and option 2 have low risk.   
Using table 1, PerceptIn quickly ruled out option 2 due to its low score across all parameters 
except Suitability, it is clear from available data that option 2 was the worst choice among the 
three.  Then internal debate began within PerceptIn on whether to move forward with option 1 
or option 3. Option 1 seemed very attractive, but it was unknown whether it would be suitable 
for autonomous driving computing tasks. If it was not suitable, then option 1 would be infeasible. 
To have a clear answer on whether option 1 would be suitable, a six-month study would be 
necessary. For option 3, it would be an extremely expensive option and with high risk. Even if 
PerceptIn invested in this project, there would be no guaranteed success.  
Since there is an unknown parameter in option 1, a deterministic analysis could not be 
conducted, and the PerceptIn management team had to use judgment calls not susceptible to 
analysis in our decision process.  
After several rounds of internal debate, the PerceptIn management team decided to compare 
option 1 and option 3 in their respective worst case scenario. If PerceptIn moved forward with 
option 1, the worst case that could happen was that six months wasted, but with limited 
investment.  If PerceptIn did find out that option 1 would not be suitable, PerceptIn could still try 
option 3. If PerceptIn moved forward with option 3, the worst case that could happen was that 
half of PerceptIn’s R&D budget and 12 months wasted. With this analysis, PerceptIn decided to 
take the safest approach, also an approach that everyone was comfortable with: move forward 
with option 1 for six months, if that does not work, then try option 3.  
 
Results: for six months, PerceptIn focused on option 1 but unfortunately PerceptIn found that 
mobile SoCs are ill-suited for autonomous driving for three reasons:  
1. the compute capability of mobile SoCs is too low for realistic end-to-end autonomous 
driving workloads. Figure 1 shows the latencies and energy consumptions of three 
perception tasks— depth estimation, object detection, and localization—on an Intel 
Coffee Lake CPU, Nvidia GTX 1060 GPU, and Nvidia TX2, which represents today’s high-
end mobile SoCs. Fig.1a shows that TX2 is much slower than the GPU, leading to a 
cumulative latency of 844.2 ms for perception alone. Fig.1b shows that TX2 has only 
marginal, sometimes even worse, energy reduction compared to the GPU due to the long 
latency.  
2. mobile SoCs do not optimize data communication between different computing units, but 
require redundant data copying coordinated by the power-hungry CPU. For instance, 
when using DSP to accelerate image processing, the CPU has to explicitly copy images 
from sensor interface to DSP through the entire memory hierarchy. PerceptIn’s 
measurement shows that this leads to an extra 1 W power overhead and up to 3 ms 
performance overhead.  
3. traditional mobile SoCs design emphasizes compute optimizations, while PerceptIn finds 
that for autonomous vehicle workloads, sensor processing support in hardware is equally 
important. For instance, autonomous vehicles require very precise and clean sensor 
synchronization, which mobile SoCs do not provide.  
 
 
Figure 1: performance and energy consumption comparisons.  
 
Starting in early 2018, PerceptIn decided to move forward with option 3 since option 1 proved 
not to work. PerceptIn thus formed a team to develop the FPGA-based DragonFly computing 
system [7, 8, 9, 12]. Option 3 was a huge success, today all autonomous vehicles shipped by 
PerceptIn are empowered by PerceptIn’s proprietary DragonFly computing system. However, if 
PerceptIn had boldly moved forward with option 3 at the beginning, PerceptIn would have been 
able to ship this great product six months earlier. The main reason of option 3’s success was that 
when using judgement call, we overestimated the technical risk. Of course, during the 
development process of option 3, we encountered a lot of technical unknowns, and fortunately 
we found solutions for these technical problems.  However, during the planning stage, using 
judgement call, we overestimated the difficulties of these technical problems, and thus led us to 
believe that starting with option 1 was a safer approach.    
 
Retrospective: PerceptIn shipped its products globally, but delayed by six months because 
PerceptIn took an R&D detour. At the planning stage, when using judgement call, PerceptIn 
overestimated the technical difficulties in option 3, and chose to start with an safe path, option 
1.  In a way, PerceptIn’s evaluation was too pessimistic, had PerceptIn taken the hard choice to 
go with option 3 initially, PerceptIn would have a much higher market share today. By making 
the decision of going with option 3, PerceptIn would have greatly widened its moat, and enlarging 
its edge over competitions. In retrospective, the root cause was that the PerceptIn team did not 
have proper anchoring and adjustment when using judgement call [11], and hence the decision 
was too pessimistic.  The lesson from this project is that, for a technology startup in hypergrowth 
mode, when its management team identify a critical technical problem, the startup should always 
choose the best solution over the safest solution.  If the team is not comfortable with its decision, 
outside expert opinion should be enlisted to help provide proper anchoring, this will definitely 
give the startup a huge advantage over its competitions who chose the easiest solution.  
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